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NOTES AND COMMENT
Constitutional Law: State bankruptcy or insolvency laws; Statutes dealing with the voluntary assignment for the benefit of creditors and the federal bankruptcy act.-When these United States
were formed and the Constitution drawn up, the underlying plan
was to give the Federal government certain express and implied
powers. What was not given either expressly or impliedly to the
Federal government the individual states res'erved to themselves.
There were certain powers granted the Federal government, which
were to be exercised by the Federal government only-such as coining
money, declaring, making treaties and the like. These are the subjects
over which Congress has exclusive jurisdiction. On the other hand
there were certain powers given the Federal government which it might
exercise, and on which the individual states could also pass legislation.
These were subjects over which each had concurrent jurisdiction.
Where concurrent jurisdiction existed over any subject matter, and
Congress failed to exercise its power, the laws passed by the individual
states were effective. However, when Congress exercised its right, and
enacted legislation upon the same subject, then the Federal law was to
take precedence and be controlling. The state legislation in so far as it
conflicted with the Federal law was suspended during such time as the
Federal law was in effect. When, if ever, the Federal law was repealed
the state act was revived, ipso facto. In other words where Congress
had power to legislate, and exercised such power the Federal law was
supreme to any passed by the states.
Article I, section 8, paragraph 4, of the United States Constitution
provides, that Congress shall have the power "To establish an uniform
rule of naturalization, and uuiform laws on the subject of bankruptcies
throughout the United States."
Therefore, in accord with the above discussion, should Congress exercise its power to enact bankruptcy laws, these are to be not only
supreme to those of any state, but they are to be the only laws dealing
with bankruptcy in the United States.
Under this Constitutional provision Congress has enacted four separate and distinct bankruptcy laws. Each similar to the other in purpose but different in detail.
Congress passed the first bankruptcy act in i8oo and repealed it in
1803'; the second was passed in 1841, repealed in 1843; the third, passed
in 1867, was repealed in 1879 and the fourth and final act was passed
in 1898, and is the law in force and effect today.
During the periods when there existed no Federal bankruptcy law,
individual states passed insolvency laws and laws for the "voluntary
assignment for the benefit of creditors." The right and practice, however, of such assignments, being inherent in the right of ownership
and existing-at common law without the aid or intervention of statute.
These laws were not only passed during the period when the Federal
government had no bankruptcy act, but they were in existence and in
operation during the time that the various Federal bankruptcy laws
were in effect and are in existence today.
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Our own state, Wisconsin, has such a law governing and regulating
the voluntary assignment for the benefit of creditors; Chapter 128,
Statutes 1925.
The first important question arising is, whether or not the voluntary assignment statute is a bankruptcy law? If these voluntary assignment regulations are to be construed as being a bankruptcy law then according to the rule, in situations where both the state and Federal government have concurrent powers and such powers are exercised, then
the state laws are to be suspended; and all actions and proceedings
under such laws are null and void. If such laws are not insolvency
acts what effect, if any, has the "discharge" feature upon them?
Though the Federal act has been in effect for more than twenty-five
years, and many states have had voluntary assignment regulations,
which have been in active operation during that time, still there has
been no Federal case to determine whether or not such acts are void,
and inoperative. In effect, however, the following cases: Parmenter
Mfg. Co. v. H. Warren Hamilton,' In Re Smith, 2 R. H. Herron Co. v.
Szperior Court,3 Mauran v. Crowtm Carpet Lining Co.,4 have held that

the Federal bankruptcy act suspends and supersedes all state insolvency
laws relating to bankruptcy that conflict with the Federal act.
At this point it might be well to discuss the legal significance and
distinction of the two words "bankruptcy" and "insolvency," for strictly
speaking and at common law there is a distinction between the two.
The former state at early common law necessitated the debtor to be
a trader and the proceedings must have been brought against, and not
by, him; while in the latter situation the proceedings were instituted
by him.' This distinction was slightly lessened and only the nature of
the institution of the proceedings, whether by or against the party, determined whether it was bankruptcy or insolvency. On the continent
of Europe the distinction between the two still exists.
However, as used in American law tod~y, the distinction between a
bankrupt and an insolvent is not generally regarded.
In 32 C. J. 81I, it is stated: "Insolvent laws belong to the same family
and are often, nearly, if not altogether,
identical with what, by way of
'6
eminence, are called bankrupt laws."

In Kunzler v. Kohans7 the court held that the meaning of bankrupt
as used in the Constitution was not the technical early English rule
but was commensurate with insolvency.
The word bankrupt in the first Federal Bankruptcy act of 18oo was
used in the strict sense of the word. The distinction became much less
observed however, and was finally broken down and abandoned by
the act of 1841. Marshall C. J. in Sturges v. Crowninshield.8
'172 Mass. 178, 51 N. E. 529, 7o Am. St. Rep. 258.
2 (D. C.)

92 Fed. 135.

136 Cal. 279, 68 Pac. 814, 89 Am. St. Rep. 124.
'23 R. I. 324, 50 Atl. 331.
'Bouvier's Law Dict. 3rd Revision, 8th edition.
3

'Cook v. Rogers, 31 Mich. 391.
5

Hill (N. Y.) 317.

4 Wheat 122.
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The present act clearly uses the loose construction for it provides for
the voluntary and involuntary "bankruptcy" which, according to the
strict construction, is "insolvency" and "bankruptcy." The two words
are used interchangeably throughout the act.
Even though the New York court in the Kunzler case (supra), said
that the word bankrupt as used in the constitution was not the strict
technical use of the word, which would only entail involuntary proceedings, the framers of the constitution must so have intended, for that
was the construction placed upon the word at the time the constitution
was drawn. We are prone to give the framers of the constitution too
much credit for their foresight in framing the constitution and to place
the interpretation and construction of the words in the constitution
to suit our needs and not according to the import those words bore at
that time.
Therefore were one to become very technical, he would insist that the
present Federal Bankruptcy act was unconstitutional in so far as it is
providing for voluntary proceedings, and that the individual states only
could legally discharge the debtor who voluntarily commenced the proceedings. However, assuming that the framers of the constitution understood and intended the present construction of the word bankruptcy,
it follows that the Federal Bankruptcy act suspends all "bankruptcy"
and "insolvency" acts that conflict with it.
The next questions which should be clarified and are: whether the
statutes on voluntary assignments for the benefit of creditors are insolvency laws, and therefor suspended, and of what effect is the discharge feature of those statutes.
It was said, earlier, that at common law a voluntary assignment for
the benefit of creditors was valid, and recognized. We have recognized
them in the United States; a large number of the states have passed
statutes similar to those of Wisconsin, regulating such assignments.
In 32 C.

J. 81l-12

it is stated:

There is no analogy between an insolvent law and a statute which for the better
protection of creditors prescribes a mode for the administration of the estates of
insolvents under assignments made by the debtors themselves.
But a general assignment law of a state which provides for a release of an insolvent assignor is an insolvent law, and is, for instance, such a law as is suspended
by a Federal bankruptcy act

J. 812 footnote 63a it is stated that
It seems that at common law in an assignment for the benefit of creditors, a
release of the debtor was void."
In 32 C.

It follows that: i. A statute, regulating the voluntary assignment
for the benefit of creditors is not within those laws classed as insol'Citing Pelton v. Sheridan, 74 Ore. 176, 144 Pac. 410;
Haijek v. Luck, 96 Tex. 517, 74 S. W. 305;
Boese v. King, io8 U. S. 5i.
"Citing Ingraham v. Wheeler, 6 Conn. :277;
Grover v. Wakerman, ii Wend (N. Y.) 185, 25 Am. D. 624;
Atkinson v. Jordal-, 5 Ohio, 293, 24 Am. D. 281;
Security Trust Co. v. Dodd, 173 U. S. 624, 633.
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vency or bankruptcy laws, and therefor is not suspended by the Federal
Bankruptcy Act. 2. Where the voluntary assignment laws contain a
release of the debtor from his personal liability on those debts, after
one year, etc., that part is clearly within the insolvency feature and is
suspended during the operation of a Federal act.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in In Re Tarnowski 1 answered these
questions to the same effect. In that case, the debtor, pursuant to the
statute assigned all his property for the benefit of his creditors; all of
them came in and received their pro rata share; at the end of the year
the debtor, under sections 128.19 and 20 Statutes, 1925, sought to be

discharged from personal liability on the debts. One of the creditors,
who had received his share, objected to the discharge on the ground
that the circuit court had no jurisdiction and that the section was suspended so long as the Federal Bankruptcy Act was in force.
Our court in upholding this contention said, that the laws regulating
voluntary assignments do not come within the purview of the bankruptcy act, therefore, those sections are still in operation; while that
part of the statutes which discharge the debtor is part of the bankruptcy
act, and that though there could be a voluntary assignment for the benefit of creditors, there could be no discharge of the debtor from his debts
by the circuit court judge as chapter 128 of the statutes provides.
2
The reasoning of the court was based on preceding Wisconsin cases'
which held to the effect that at common law the right to a voluntary
assignment existed but did not, ipso facto, discharge the total debt,
being merely a release of the amount paid. However, the discharging
of the debtor's personal liability changed the voluntary assignments
aspect and bad the legal effect of making that part of the assignment
law a bankrupt law.
The practical effect of this decision will be: I. The circuit court of
Wisconsin will no longer find voluntary assignment cases on its calendar, because the only effect in the future, of such a proceeding would
be to decide the claims of creditors, and add to the burdens of the
debtor; he will no longer be able to be released from personal liability
for his debts, which, after all, is the only object sought by this proceeding. 2. The composition of creditors, whereby all the cerditors come in,
and consent to take an agreed pro rata share, for the release of the
debtor's further liability, will be used more extensively. 3. The Federal bankrupcty proceedings will be more frequently used, even though
they are slower and more costly.
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On October 25, 1926, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled
on an unusually close constitutional question,' the facts of the case
being substantially as follows: One Meyers was appointed, by and
with the consent of the Senate, to be a postmaster of the first class in
Portland, Oregon, for a term of four years. The appointment was
made on July 21, 1917, and on January 20, 192o, his resignation was
demanded by the President. Myers refused to leave office. The Post"210 N. W., 836, 19o Wis.

v. Muse, ii7 Wis. 339, 94 N. W. 365.
Segnitz v. Garden City, B. & T. Co., 107 Wis. 176, 83 N. W.
1 Myers v. United States, 71 L. ed. (adv. 27).
32Duryea

329.

